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Abstract
Motivated by settings in which predictive models may be required to be non-discriminatory
with respect to certain attributes (such as race), but even collecting the sensitive attribute
may be forbidden or restricted, we initiate the study of fair learning under the constraint of
differential privacy. We design two learning algorithms that simultaneously promise differential
privacy and equalized odds, a “fairness” condition that corresponds to equalizing false positive
and negative rates across protected groups. Our first algorithm is a private implementation
of the equalized odds post-processing approach of [Hardt et al., 2016]. This algorithm is
appealingly simple, but must be able to use protected group membership explicitly at test
time, which can be viewed as a form of “disparate treatment”. Our second algorithm is a
differentially private version of the oracle-efficient in-processing approach of [Agarwal et al.,
2018] that can be used to find the optimal fair classifier, given access to a subroutine that can
solve the original (not necessarily fair) learning problem. This algorithm is more complex but
need not have access to protected group membership at test time. We identify new tradeoffs
between fairness, accuracy, and privacy that emerge only when requiring all three properties,
and show that these tradeoffs can be milder if group membership may be used at test time.
We conclude with a brief experimental evaluation.
1 Introduction
Large-scale algorithmic decision making, often driven by machine learning on consumer data, has
increasingly run afoul of various social norms, laws and regulations. A prominent concern is when
a learned model exhibits discrimination against some demographic group, perhaps based on race
or gender. Concerns over such algorithmic discrimination have led to a recent flurry of research
on fairness in machine learning, which includes both new tools and methods for designing fair
models, and studies of the tradeoffs between predictive accuracy and fairness [ACM, 2019].
At the same time, both recent and longstanding laws and regulations often restrict the use of
“sensitive” or protected attributes in algorithmic decision-making. U.S. law prevents the use
of race in the development or deployment of consumer lending or credit scoring models, and
recent provisions in the E.U. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) restrict or prevent
even the collection of racial data for consumers. These two developments — the demand for
non-discriminatory algorithms and models on the one hand, and the restriction on the collection
or use of protected attributes on the other — present technical conundrums, since the most
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straightforward methods for ensuring fairness generally require knowing or using the attribute
being protected. It seems difficult to guarantee that a trained model is not discriminating against
(say) a racial group if we cannot even identify members of that group in the data.
A recent line of work [Veale and Binns, 2017, Kilbertus et al., 2018] made these cogent observations,
and proposed an interesting solution employing the cryptographic tool of secure multiparty
computation (commonly abbreviated MPC ). In this model, we imagine a commercial entity with
access to consumer data that excludes race, but this entity would like to build a predictive model
for, say, commercial lending, under the constraint that the model be non-discriminatory by race
with respect to some standard fairness notion (e.g. equality of false rejection rates). In order to
do so, the company engages in MPC with a set of regulatory agencies, which are either trusted
parties holding consumers’ race data [Veale and Binns, 2017], or hold among them a secret
sharing of race data, provided by the consumers themselves [Kilbertus et al., 2018]. Together the
company and the regulators apply standard fair machine learning techniques in a distributed
fashion. In this way the company never directly accesses the race data, but still manages to
produce a fair model, which is the output of the MPC. The guarantee provided by this solution is
the standard one of MPC — namely, the company learns nothing more than whatever is implied
by its own consumer data, and the fair model returned by the protocol .
Our point of departure stems from our assertion that MPC is the wrong guarantee to give if our
motivation is ensuring that data about an individual’s race does not “leak” to the company via
the model. In particular, MPC implies nothing about what individual information can already be
inferred from the learned model itself . The guarantee we would prefer is that the company’s data
and the fair model do not leak anything about an individual’s race beyond what can be inferred
from “population level” correlations. That is, the fair model should not leak anything beyond
inferences that could be carried out even if the individual in question had declined to provide her
racial identity . This is exactly the type of promise made by differential privacy [Dwork et al.,
2006b], but not by MPC.
The insufficiency of MPC. To emphasize the fact that concerns over leakage of protected
attributes under the guarantee of MPC are more than hypothetical, we describe a natural example
where this leakage would actually occur.
Example. An SVM model, trained in the standard way, is represented by the underlying support
vectors, which are just data points from the training data. Thus, if race is a feature represented
in the training data, an SVM model computed under MPC reveals the race of the individuals
represented in the support vectors. This is the case even if race is uncorrelated with all other
features and labels, in which case differential privacy would prevent such inferences. We note
that there are differentially private implementations of SVMs.
The reader might object that, in this example, the algorithm is trained to use racial data at test
time, and so the output of the algorithm is directly affected by race. But there are also examples
in which the same problems with MPC can arise even when race is not an input to the learned
model, and race is again uncorrelated with the company’s data. We also note that SVMs are just
an extreme case of a learned model fitting, and thus potentially revealing, its training data. For
example, points from the training set can also be recovered from trained neural networks [Song
et al., 2017].
Our approach: differential privacy. These examples show that cryptographic approaches to
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“locking up” sensitive information during a training process are insufficient as a privacy mechanism
— we need to explicitly reason about what can be inferred from the output of a learning algorithm,
not simply say that we cannot learn more than such inferences. In this paper we thus instead
consider the problem of designing fair learning algorithms that also promise differential privacy
with respect to consumer race, and thus give strong guarantees about what can be inferred from
the learned model.
We note that the guarantee of differential privacy is somewhat subtle, and does not promise
that the company will be unable to infer race. For example, it might be that a feature that the
company already has, such as zip codes, is perfectly correlated with race, and a computation
that is differentially private might reveal this correlation. In this case, the company will be able
to infer racial information about its customers. However, differential privacy prevents leakage of
individual racial data beyond what can be inferred from population-level correlations.
Like [Veale and Binns, 2017], our approach can be viewed as a collaboration between a company
holding non-sensitive consumer data and a regulator holding sensitive data. Our algorithms allow
the regulator to build fair models from the combined data set (potentially also under MPC) in
a way that ensures the company, or any other party with access to the model or its decisions,
cannot infer the race of any consumer in the data much more accurately than they could do from
population-level statistics alone. Thus, we comply with the spirit of laws and regulations asking
that sensitive attributes not be leaked, while still allowing them to be used to enforce fairness.
1.1 Our Results
We study the problem of learning classifiers from data with protected attributes. More specifically,
we are given a class of classifiers H and we output a randomized classifier in ∆pHq (i.e. a
distribution over H). The training data consists of m individual data points of the form
pX,A, Y q. Here X P X is the vector of unprotected attributes, A P A is the protected attribute
and Y P t0, 1u is the binary label. As discussed above, our algorithms achieve three goals
simultaneously:
• Differential privacy: Our learning algorithms satisfy differential privacy [Dwork et al.,
2006b] with respect to protected attributes. (They need not be differentially private with
respect to the unprotected attributes X — although sometimes are.)
• Fairness: Our learning algorithms guarantee approximate notions of statistical fairness
across the groups specified by the protected attribute. The particular statistical fairness
notion we focus on is Equalized Odds [Hardt et al., 2016], which in the binary classification
case reduces to asking that false positive rates and false negative rates be approximately
equal, conditional on all values of the protected attribute (but our techniques apply to
other notions of statistical fairness as well, including statistical parity).
• Accuracy: Our output classifier has error rate comparable to non-private benchmarks in
∆pHq consistent with the fairness constraints.
We evaluate fairness and error as in-sample quantities. Out-of-sample generalization for both
error and fairness follow from standard sample-complexity bounds in learning theory, and so we
elide this complication for clarity (but see e.g. the treatment in [Kearns et al., 2018b] for formal
generalization bounds).
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We start with a simple extension of the post-processing approach of [Hardt et al., 2016]. Their
algorithm starts with a possibly unfair classifier pY and derives a fair classifier by mixing pY with
classifiers which are based on protected attributes. This involves solving a linear program which
takes quantities qˆyˆay as input. Here qˆyˆay is the fraction of data points with pY “ yˆ, A “ a, Y “ y.
To make this approach differentially private with respect to protected attributes, we start with pY
which is learned without using protected attributes and we use standard techniques to perturb
the qˆyˆay’s before feeding them into the linear program, in a way that guarantees differential
privacy. We analyze the additional error and fairness violation that results from the perturbation.
Detailed results can be found in Section 3.
Although having the virtue of being exceedingly simple, this first approach has two significant
drawbacks. First, even without privacy, this post-processing approach does not in general
produce classifiers with error that is comparable to that of the best fair classifiers, and our
privacy preserving modification inherits this limitation. Second, and often more importantly, this
post-processing approach crucially requires that protected attributes can be used at test time,
and this isn’t feasible (or legal) in certain applications. Even when it is, if racial information
is held only by a regulator, although it may be feasible to train a model once using MPC, it
probably is not feasible to make test-time decisions repeatedly using MPC.
We then consider the approach of [Agarwal et al., 2018], which we refer to it as in-processing
(to distinguish it from post-processing). They give an oracle-efficient algorithm, which assumes
access to a subroutine that can optimally solve classification problems absent a fairness constraint
(in practice, and in our experiments, these “oracles” are implemented using simple learning
heuristics). Their approach does not have either of the above drawbacks: it does not require that
protected features be available at test time, and it is guaranteed to produce the approximately
optimal fair classifier. The algorithm is correspondingly more complicated. The main idea
of their approach (following the presentation of [Kearns et al., 2018b]) is to show that the
optimal fair classifier can be found as the equilibrium of a zero-sum game between a “Learner”
who selects classifiers in H and an “Auditor” who finds fairness violations. This equilibrium
can be approximated by iterative play of the game, in which the Auditor plays exponentiated
gradient descent and the Learner plays best responses (computed via an efficient cost-sensitive
classification oracle). To make this approach private, we add Laplace noise to the gradients used
by the Auditor and we let the Learner run the exponential mechanism (or some other private
learning oracle) to compute approximate best responses. Our technical contribution is to show
that the Learner and the Auditor still converge to an approximate equilibrium despite the noise
introduced for privacy. Detailed results can be found in Section 4.
One of the most interesting aspects of our results is an inherent tradeoff that arises between
privacy, accuracy, and fairness, that doesn’t arise when any two of these desiderata are considered
alone. This manifests itself as the parameter “B” in our in-processing result (see Table 1) which
mediates the tradeoff between error, fairness and privacy. This parameter also appears in the
(non-private) algorithm of [Agarwal et al., 2018]—but there it serves only to mediate a tradeoff
between fairness and running time. At a high level, the reason for this difference is that without
the need for privacy, we can increase the number of iterations of the algorithm to decrease the
error to any desired level. However, when we also need to protect privacy, there is an additional
tradeoff, and increasing the number of iterations also requires increasing the scale of the gradient
perturbations, which may not always decrease error.
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Algorithm
Assumptions
on H
Fairness
Guarantee
Needs
access to A
at test time?
Does it
guarantee
privacy of
X as well?
Error Fairness Violation
DP-postprocessing None
Equalized
Odds
Yes No rO ´ |A|m¯ 1 rO ´ 1min qˆaym¯
DP-oracle-learner
dH ă 8
dH :“ V CpHq
Equalized
Odds
No No rOˆ Bmin qˆayb |A|dHm ˙ B´1 ` rOˆ 1min qˆayb |A|dHm ˙
|H| ă 8 Equalized
Odds
No Yes rOˆ Bmin qˆayb |A| lnp|H|qm ˙ B´1 ` rOˆ 1min qˆayb |A| lnp|H|qm ˙
|H| ă 8,
H has maximally
discriminatory
classifiers
Equalized
False Positive
Rate
Yes Yes rOˆ |A|min qˆayb |A| lnp|H|qm ˙ rOˆ |A|min qˆayb |A| lnp|H|qm ˙
Table 1: Summary of Results for Our Differentially Private Fair Learning Algorithms. In this table, m is the
training sample size, qˆay is the fraction of data with A “ a and Y “ y, |A| is the number of protected groups,
and  is the privacy parameter. B is explained in text. For all but the marked error bound, the comparison
benchmark is the optimal fair classifier. The marked bound is compared to a weaker benchmark: the outcome of
the non-private post-processing procedure.
This tradeoff exhibits an additional interesting feature. Recall that as we discussed above, the
in-processing approach works even if we can not use protected attributes at test time. But if we
are allowed to use protected attributes at test time, we are able to obtain a better tradeoff between
these quantities — essentially eliminating the role of the variable B that would otherwise mediate
this tradeoff. We give details of this improvement in section 4.1 (for this result, we also need to
relax the fairness requirement from Equalized Odds to Equalized False Positive Rates). The main
step in the proof is to show that, for small constant B and H containing certain “maximally
discriminatory” classifiers which make decisions solely on the basis of group membership, we can
give a better characterization of the Learner’s strategy at the approximate equilibrium of the
zero-sum game.
Finally, we provide evidence that using protected attributes at test time is necessary for obtaining
this better tradeoff. In Section 4.2, we consider the sensitivity of computing the error of the
optimal classifier subject to fairness constraints. We show that this sensitivity can be substantially
higher when the classifier cannot use protected attributes at test time, which shows that higher
error must be introduced to estimate this error privately.
1.2 Related Work
The literature on algorithmic fairness is growing rapidly, and is by now far too extensive to
exhaustively cover here. See [Chouldechova and Roth, 2018] for a recent survey. Our work
builds directly on that of [Hardt et al., 2016], [Agarwal et al., 2018], and [Kearns et al., 2018b].
In particular, [Hardt et al., 2016] introduces the “equalized odds” definition that we take as
our primary fairness goal, and gave a simple post-processing algorithm that we modify to
make differentially private. [Agarwal et al., 2018] derives an “oracle efficient” algorithm which
can optimally solve the fair empirical risk minimization problem (for a variety of statistical
fairness constraints, including equalized odds) given oracles (implemented with heuristics) for
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the unconstrained learning problem. [Kearns et al., 2018b] generalize this algorithm to be able
to handle infinitely many protected groups. We give a differentially private version of [Agarwal
et al., 2018] as well.
Our paper is directly inspired by [Kilbertus et al., 2018], who study how to train fair machine
learning models by encrypting sensitive attributes and applying secure multiparty computation
(SMC). We share the goal of [Kilbertus et al., 2018]: we want to train fair classifiers without leaking
information about an individual’s race through their participation in the training. Our starting
point is the observation that differential privacy, rather than secure multiparty computation, is
the right tool for this.
We use differential privacy [Dwork et al., 2006b] as our notion of individual privacy, which has
become an influential “solution concept” for data privacy in the last decade. See [Dwork and
Roth, 2014] for a survey. We make use of standard tools from this literature, including the
Laplace mechanism [Dwork et al., 2006b], the exponential mechanism [McSherry and Talwar,
2007] and composition theorems [Dwork et al., 2006a, Dwork et al., 2010].
2 Model and Preliminaries
Suppose we are given a data set of m individuals drawn i.i.d. from an unknown distribution P
where each individual is described by a tuple pX,A, Y q. X P X forms a vector of unprotected
attributes, A P A is the protected attribute where |A| ă 8, and Y P Y is a binary label. Without
loss of generality, we write A “ t0, 1, . . . , |A| ´ 1u and let Y “ t0, 1u. Let pP denote the empirical
distribution of the observed data. Our primary goal is to develop an algorithm to learn a (possibly
randomized) fair classifier pY , with an algorithm that guarantees the privacy of the sensitive
attributes A. By privacy, we mean differential privacy, and by fairness, we mean (approximate
versions of) the Equalized Odds condition of [Hardt et al., 2016]. Both of these notions are
parameterized: differential privacy has a parameter , and the approximate fairness constraint
is parameterized by γ. Our main interest is in characterizing the tradeoff between , γ, and
classification error.
2.1 Notations
• P and E refer to the probability and expectation operators taken with respect to the true
underlying distribution P. pP and pE are the corresponding empirical versions.
• We will use notation FPappY q and TPappY q to refer to the false and true positive rates of pY
on the subpopulation tA “ au.
FPappY q “ P ”pY “ 1 |A “ a, Y “ 0ı , TPappY q “ P ”pY “ 1 |A “ a, Y “ 1ı
xFPappY q and xTPappY q are used to refer to the empirical false and true positive rates.
∆FPappY q “ |FPappY q ´FP0ppY q| and ∆TPappY q “ |TPappY q ´TP0ppY q| are used to measurepY ’s false and true positive rate discrepancies across groups. ∆xFPappY q and ∆xTPappY q are
the corresponding empirical versions.
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• qˆyˆay “ pP rpY “ yˆ, A “ a, Y “ ys is the empirical fraction of the data with pY “ yˆ, A “ a,
and Y “ y. With slight abuse of notation, we will use qˆay “ pP rA “ a, Y “ ys “ qˆ1ay ` qˆ0ay
to denote the empirical fraction of the data with A “ a and Y “ y. We will see that
mina,y qˆay shows up in our analyses and plays a role in the performance of our algorithms.
• xerr ppY q “ pP rpY ‰ Y s is the training error of the classifier pY . Given a randomized classifier
Q P ∆pHq, xerr pQq “ Eh„Q ”pP rhpXq ‰ Y sı.
2.2 Fairness
Definition 2.1 (γ-Equalized Odds Fairness). We say a classifier pY satisfies the γ-Equalized
Odds condition with respect to the attribute A, if for all a, a1 P A, the false and true positive rates
of pY in the subpopulations tA “ au and tA “ a1u are within γ of one another. In other words,
for all a, a1 P A, ˇˇˇ
FPappY q ´ FPa1ppY qˇˇˇ ď γ , ˇˇˇTPappY q ´ TPa1ppY qˇˇˇ ď γ
The above constraint involves quadratically many inequalities in |A|. It will be more convenient to
instead work with a slightly different formulation of γ-Equalized Odds in which we constrain the
difference between false and true positive rates in the subpopulation tA “ au and the corresponding
rates for tA “ 0u to be at most γ for all a ‰ 0. The choice of group 0 as an anchor is arbitrary
and without loss of generality. The result is a set of only linearly many constraints. For all a P A:
∆FPappY q “ ˇˇˇFPappY q ´ FP0ppY qˇˇˇ ď γ , ∆TPappY q “ ˇˇˇTPappY q ´ TP0ppY qˇˇˇ ď γ
Since the distribution P is not known, we will work with empirical versions of the above quantities,
in which all the probabilities will be taken with respect to the empirical distribution of the
observed data pP. Since we will generally be dealing with this definition of fairness, we will use
the shortened term “γ-fair” throughout the paper to refer to “γ-Equalized Odds fair”.
2.3 Differential Privacy
Let D be a data universe from which a database D of size m is drawn and let M be an
algorithm that takes the database D as input and outputs MpDq P O. Informally speaking,
differential privacy requires that the addition or removal of a single data entry should have
little (distributional) effect on the output of the mechanism. In other words, for every pair of
neighboring databases D „ D1 P Dm that differ in at most one entry, differential privacy requires
that the distribution of MpDq and MpD1q are “close” to each other where closeness are measured
by the privacy parameters  and δ.
Definition 2.2 (p, δq-Differential Privacy (DP) [Dwork et al., 2006b]). A randomized algorithm
M : Dm Ñ O is said to be p, δq-differentially private if for all pairs of neighboring databases
D,D1 P Dm and all O Ď O,
P rMpDq P Os ď e P “MpD1q P O‰` δ
where P is taken with respect to the randomness of M . if δ “ 0, M is said to be -DP.
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Recall that our data universe is D “ pX ,A,Yq, which will be convenient to partition as pX ,YqˆA.
Given a dataset D of size m, we will write it as a pair D “ pDI , DSq where DI P pX ,Yqm
represents the insensitive attributes and DS P Am represents the sensitive attributes. We will
sometimes incidentally guarantee differential privacy over the entire data universe D (see Table
1), but our main goal will be to promise differential privacy only with respect to the sensitive
attributes. Write DS „ D1S to denote that DS and D1S differ in exactly one coordinate (i.e. in
one person’s group membership). An algorithm is p, δq-differentially private in the sensitive
attributes if for all DI P pX ,Yqm and for all DS „ D1S P Am and for all O Ď O, we have:
P rMpDI , DSq P Os ď e P
“
MpDI , D1Sq P O
‰` δ
Differentially private mechanisms usually work by deliberately injecting perturbations into
quantities computed from the sensitive data set, and used as part of the computation. The
injected perturbation is sometimes “explicitly” in the form of a (zero-mean) noise sampled from
a known distribution, say Laplace or Gaussian, where the scale of noise is calibrated to the
sensitivity of the query function to the input data. However, in some other cases, the noise is
“implicitly” injected by maintaining a distribution over a set of possible outcomes for the algorithm
and outputting a sample from that distribution. The Laplace or Gaussian mechanisms which
are two standard techniques to achieve differential privacy follow the former approach by adding
Laplace or Gaussian noise of appropriate scale to the outcome of computation, respectively. The
Exponential mechanism instead falls into the latter case and is often used when an object, say a
classifier, with optimal utility is to be chosen privately. In the setting of this paper, to guarantee
the privacy of the sensitive attribute A in our algorithms, we will be using the Laplace and the
Exponential Mechanisms which are briefly reviewed below. See [Dwork and Roth, 2014] for a
more detailed discussion and analysis.
Let’s start with the Laplace mechanism which, as stated before, perturbs the given query function
f with zero-mean Laplace noise calibrated to the `1-sensitivity of the query function. The
`1-sensitivity of a function is essentially how much a function would change in `1 norm if one
changed at most one entry of the database.
Definition 2.3 (`1-sensitivity of a function). The `1-sensitivity of f : Dm Ñ Rk is
∆f “ max
D,D1 PDm
D„D1
››fpDq ´ fpD1q››
1
Definition 2.4 (Laplace Mechanism [Dwork et al., 2006b]). Given a query function f : Dm Ñ Rk,
a database D P Dm, and a privacy parameter , the Laplace mechanism outputs:
rf pDq “ f pDq ` pW1, . . . ,Wkq
where Wi’s are i.i.d. random variables drawn from Lap p∆f{q.
Keep in mind that besides having privacy, we would like the privately computed query rfpDq to
have some reasonable accuracy. The following theorem which uses standard tail bounds for a
Laplace random variable formalizes the tradeoff between privacy and accuracy for the Laplace
mechanism.
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Theorem 2.1 (Privacy vs. Accuracy of the Laplace Mechanism [Dwork et al., 2006b]). The
Laplace mechanism guarantees -differential privacy and that with probability at least 1´ δ,
|| rf pDq ´ f pDq ||8 ď lnˆk
δ
˙
¨
ˆ
∆f

˙
While the Laplace mechanism is often used when the task at hand is to calculate a bounded
numeric query (e.g. mean, median), the Exponential mechanism is used when the goal is to
output an object (e.g. a classifier) with maximum utility (i.e. minimum loss). To formalize the
exponential mechanism, let ` : Dm ˆH Ñ R be a loss function that given an input database
D P Dm and h P H, specifies the loss of h on D by ` pD,hq. Without a privacy constraint,
the goal would be to output arg minhPH ` pD,hq for the given database D, but when privacy is
required, the private algorithm must output arg minhPH ` pD,hq with some “perturbation” which
is formalized in the following definition. Let ∆` be the sensitivity of the loss function ` with
respect to the database argument D. In other words,
∆` “ max
h PH maxD,D1 PDm
D„D1
ˇˇ
` pD,hq ´ ` `D1, h˘ˇˇ
Definition 2.5 (Exponential Mechansim [McSherry and Talwar, 2007]). Given a database D P
Dm and a privacy parameter , output h P H with probability proportional to exp p´`pD,hq{2∆`q.
Theorem 2.2 (Privacy vs. Accuracy of the Exponential Mechanism [McSherry and Talwar,
2007]). Let h‹ “ arg minhPH ` pD,hq and rh P H be the output of the Exponential mechanism.
We have that rh is -DP and that with probability at least 1´ δ,
|` pD,rhq ´ ` pD,h‹q | ď lnˆ |H|
δ
˙
¨
ˆ
2∆`

˙
We will discuss some important properties of differential privacy such as post-processing and
Composition Theorems in Appendix A.
3 Differentially Private Fair Learning: Post-processing
In this section we will present our first differentially private fair learning algorithm which will be
called DP-postprocessing. The DP-postprocessing algorithm is a private variant of the fair
learning algorithm introduced in [Hardt et al., 2016] where decisions made by an arbitrary base
classifier pY have their false and true positive rates equalized across different groups tA “ au in a
post-processing step. Due to the desire for privacy of the sensitive attribute A, we assume the
base classifier pY is trained only on the unprotected attributes X and that A is used only for the
post-processing step.
The proposed algorithm of [Hardt et al., 2016] derives a fair classifier pYp by mixing pY with
classifiers depending on the protected attributes. pYp is specified by a parameter p “ ppyˆaqyˆ,a, a
vector of probabilities such that pyˆa :“ P rpYp “ 1 | pY “ yˆ, A “ as. Among all fair pYp’s, the one with
minimum error can be found by solving a linear program whose coefficients depend only on the
qˆyˆay quantities, and thus privacy will be achieved if these quantities are calculated privately using
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the Laplace mechanism. Once we do this, the differential privacy guarantees of the algorithm will
follow from the post-processing property (Lemma A.1). While the approach is straightforward
and simply implementable, the privately learned classifier will need to explicitly take as input
the sensitive attribute A at test time which is not feasible (or legal) in all applications.
We have the DP-postprocessing algorithm written in Algorithm 1. Notice as discussed above,
to guarantee differential privacy of the protected attribute, Algorithm 1 computes q˜yˆay (a noisy
version of qˆyˆay) and then feeds q˜yˆay into the linear program ĂLP (1). In this linear program, terms
with tildes (e.g. q˜ay, Ăerr , ĂFP, ĂTP) are defined with respect to q˜yˆay instead of qˆyˆay. We analyze
the performance of Algorithm 1 in Theorem 3.1. Its proof is deferred to Appendix B.2. The
main step of the proof is to understand how the introduced noise propagates to the solution of
the linear program. We aill also briefly review the fair learning approach of [Hardt et al., 2016]
in Appendix B.1.
ĂLP: -Differentially Private Linear Program
arg min
p
Ăerr ppYpq
s.t. @a P A
a‰0 ∆
ĂFPappYpq ď γ ` 4 ln p4|A|{βq
mintq˜a0, q˜00um
∆ ĂTPappYpq ď γ ` 4 ln p4|A|{βq
mintq˜a1, q˜01um
0 ď pyˆa ď 1 @yˆ, a
(1)
Ăerr ´pYp¯ :“ řyˆ,a pq˜yˆa0 ´ q˜yˆa1q ¨ pyˆa `řyˆ,a q˜yˆa1
∆ĂFPa ´pYp¯ :“ ˇˇˇ ĂFPappY q ¨ p1a ` ´1´ ĂFPappY q¯ ¨ p0a ´ ĂFP0ppY q ¨ p10 ´ ´1´ ĂFP0ppY q¯ ¨ p00 ˇˇˇ
∆ ĂTPa ´pYp¯ :“ ˇˇˇ ĂTPappY q ¨ p1a ` ´1´ ĂTPappY q¯ ¨ p0a ´ ĂTP0ppY q ¨ p10 ´ ´1´ ĂTP0ppY q¯ ¨ p00 ˇˇˇ
Algorithm 1: -differentially private fair classification: DP-postprocessing
Input: privacy parameter ,
confidence parameter β, fairness violation γ,
training examples tpXi, Ai, Yiqumi“1
Ô Train the base classifier pY on tpXi, Yiqumi“1.
Ô Calculate qˆyˆay “ pP rpY “ yˆ, A “ a, Y “ ys.
Ô Sample Wyˆay
i.i.d.„ Lap p2{mq for all yˆ, a, y.
Ô Perturb each qˆyˆay: q˜yˆay “ qˆyˆay `Wyˆay.
Ô Solve ĂLP (1) to get the minimizer p˜‹.
Output: p˜‹, the trained classifier pY
Theorem 3.1 (Error-Privacy, Fairness-Privacy Tradeoffs). Suppose min
a,y
tqˆayu ą 4 ln p4|A|{βq { pmq.
Let p‹ be the optimal γ-fair solution of the non-private post-processing algorithm of [Hardt et al.,
2016] and let rp‹ be the output of Algorithm 1 which is the optimal solution of ĂLP (1). With
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probability at least 1´ β,
xerr ´pYrp‹¯ ď xerr ´pYp‹¯` 24|A| ln p4|A|{βq
m
and for all a ‰ 0,
∆xFPa ´pYrp‹¯ ď γ ` 8 ln p4|A|{βq
mintqˆa0, qˆ00um´ 4 ln p4|A|{βq
∆xTPa ´pYrp‹¯ ď γ ` 8 ln p4|A|{βq
mintqˆa1, qˆ01um´ 4 ln p4|A|{βq
We emphasize that the accuracy guarantee stated in Theorem 3.1 is relative to the non-private
post-processing algorithm, not relative to the optimal fair classifier. This is because the non-
private post-processing algorithm itself has no such optimality guarantees: its main virtue is
simplicity. In the next section, we analyze a more complicated algorithm that is competitive
with the optimal fair classifier.
4 Differentially Private Fair Learning: In-processing
γ-fair ERM Problem
min
Q P∆pHq
xerr pQq
s.t. @a P A
a‰0 : ∆
xFPapQq ď γ
∆ xTPapQq ď γ
(2)
In this section we will introduce our second differentially private fair learning algorithm which
will be called DP-oracle-learner and is based on the algorithm presented in [Agarwal et al.,
2018]. Essentially, [Agarwal et al., 2018] reduces the γ-fair learning problem (2) into the following
Lagrangian min-max problem:
min
Q P∆pHq
max
λ PΛ LpQ,λq :“ xerr pQq ` λJpr pQq (3)
Here H is a given class of binary classifiers with dH “ V CDpHq ă 8 and ∆pHq is the set of
all randomized classifiers that can be obtained by functions in H. pr pQq is a vector of fairness
violations of the classifier Q across groups, and λ P Λ “ tλ : ||λ||1 ď Bu is the dual variable
where the bound B is chosen to ensure convergence. In this work,
prpQq :“
»———–
xFPapQq ´ xFP0pQq ´ γxFP0pQq ´ xFPapQq ´ γxTPapQq ´ xTP0pQq ´ γxTP0pQq ´ xTPapQq ´ γ
fiffiffiffifl
a PA
a‰0
P R4p|A|´1q , λ “
»——–
λpa,0,`q
λpa,0,´q
λpa,1,`q
λpa,1,´q
fiffiffifl
a PA
a‰0
P R4p|A|´1q
The method developed by [Agarwal et al., 2018], in the language of [Kearns et al., 2018b] gives
a reduction from finding an optimal fair classifier to finding the equilibrium of a two-player
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zero-sum game played between a “Learner” (Q-player) who needs to solve an unconstrained
learning problem (given access to an efficient cost-sensitive classification oracle) and an “Auditor”
(λ-player) who finds fairness violations. In an iterative framework, having the learner play
its best response and the auditor play a no-regret learning algorithm (we use exponentiated
gradient descent, or “multiplicative weights”) guarantees convergence of the average plays to the
equilibrium ([Freund and Schapire, 1996]).
In Algorithm 3, to make the above approach differentially private, Laplace mechanism is used by
the Auditor when computing the gradients and we let the Learner run the exponential mechanism
(or some other private learning oracle) to compute approximate best responses. This is the
differentially private equivalent of assuming access to a perfect oracle, as is done in [Agarwal
et al., 2018, Kearns et al., 2018b]. In practice, the exponential mechanism would be substituted
for a computationally efficient private learner with heuristic accuracy guarantees. Subroutine 2
reduces the Learner’s best response problem to privately solving a cost sensitive classification
problem solved with a private oracle CSC1pHq. Here we sketch the main steps of analyzing
Algorithm 3. All the proofs of this section, as well as a brief review of [Agarwal et al., 2018]’s
approach for the fair learning problem without privacy constraints, will appear in Appendix C.
We assume in this section that the VC dimension of H (“ dH) is finite, in which case the
set of strategies for the Learner reduces to ∆pHpSqq, where HpSq is the set of all possible
labellings induced on S :“ tXiumi“1 by H. In other words, HpSq “ tphpX1q, . . . , hpXmqq|h P Hu
and recall that |HpSq| ď OpmdHq by Sauer’s Lemma. Note that since the privacy of the protected
attribute A is required, we need A to be excluded from the domain of functions in H (“A-blind
classification”) and accordingly, from the set S. Because otherwise there might be some privacy
loss of A through using HpSq as the range of the exponential mechanism for the private Learner.
This assumption is of course not necessary if one is willing to instead assume |H| ă 8. We will
have a discussion later where we state our guarantees assuming |H| ă 8 instead of dH ă 8.
Note that having HpSq as the range of the exponential mechanism used by the private Learner
implies the privacy of the unprotected attributes X is not guaranteed. However, in the more
general setting where |H| ă 8 is assumed, the privacy of the unprotected attributes comes for
free as there will be no reduction of H to HpSq.
Subroutine 2: BEST
1
h
Input: λ, training examples tpXi, Ai, Yiqumi“1, privacy guarantee 1
for i “ 1, . . . ,m do
C0i Ð 1tYi ‰ 0u
C1i Ð 1tYi ‰ 1u ` λpAi,Yi,`q´λpAi,Yi,´qqˆAiYi 1tAi ‰ 0u ´
ř
aPA
a‰0
λpa,Yi,`q´λpa,Yi,´q
qˆAiYi
1tAi “ 0u
end
Call CSC1pHq with tXi, C0i , C1i umi“1 to get h‹.
Output: h‹
We first bound the regret of the Learner and the Auditor in Lemma 4.1 and 4.2 by understanding
how the introduced noise affect these regrets. Proofs of these Lemmas follow from the “sensitivity”
and “accuracy” of the private players which are all stated and proved in Appendix C.2.
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Algorithm 3: p, δq-differentially private fair classification: DP-oracle-learner
Input: privacy parameters p, δq,
bound B, VC dimension dH, confidence parameter β, fairness violation γ,
training examples tpXi, Ai, Yiqumi“1
T Ð B
a
ln p4|A| ´ 3qm
2 p2|A|B ` 1qaln p1{δq pdH ln pmq ` ln p2{βqq , η Ð 12
c
ln p4|A| ´ 3q
Trθ1 Ð 0 P R4p|A|´1q
for t “ 1, . . . , T dorλt,k Ð B exp prθt,kq
1`řk1 exp prθt,k1 q for 1 ď k ď 4p|A| ´ 1qrht Ð BEST1h prλtq with 1 “ {p4aT lnp1{δqq
Sample W t P R4p|A|´1q where Wt,k i.i.d.„ Lap p 8|A|
?
T lnp1{δq
pmina,ytqˆayum´1q¨qrt Ð prt prhtq `W trθt`1 Ð rθt ` ηrt
endrQÐ 1T řTt“1 rht, rλÐ 1T řTt“1 rλt
Output: p rQ, rλq
Lemma 4.1 (Regret of the Private Learner). Suppose trhtuTt“1 is the sequence of best responses
to trλtuTt“1 by the private Learner over T rounds. We have that with probability at least 1´ β{2,
1
T
Tÿ
t“1
Lprht, rλtq ´ 1
T
min
QP∆pHq
Tÿ
t“1
LpQ, rλtq ď 8 p2|A|B ` 1qaT ln p1{δq pdH ln pmq ` ln p2T {βqqpmina,ytqˆayum´ 1q ¨ 
Lemma 4.2 (Regret of the Private Auditor). Let trλtuTt“1 be the sequence of exponentiated
gradient descent plays (with learning rate η) by the private Auditor to given trhtuTt“1 of the private
Learner over T rounds. We have that with probability at least 1´ β{2,
1
T
max
λPΛ
Tÿ
t“1
Lprht,λq´ 1
T
Tÿ
t“1
Lprht, rλtq ď B lnp4|A| ´ 3q
ηT
`4ηB
˜
1` 4|A|
a
T lnp1{δq lnp8T |A|{βq
pmina,ytqˆayum´ 1q ¨ 
¸2
Now in Theorem 4.3, given the regret bounds of Lemma 4.1 and 4.2, we can characterize the
average plays of both players. This theorem provides a formal guarantee that the output p rQ, rλq
of Algorithm 3 forms a “ν-approximate equilibrium” of the game between the Learner and the
Auditor (where ν is specified in the theorem). This property essentially means neither play would
gain more than ν if they palyed an strategy other than the ones output by the Algorithm.
Theorem 4.3. Let p rQ, rλq be the output of Algorithm 3. We have that with probability at least
1´ β, p rQ, rλq is a ν-approximate solution of the game, i.e.,
Lp rQ, rλq ď LpQ, rλq ` ν for all Q P ∆pHq
Lp rQ, rλq ě Lp rQ,λq ´ ν for all λ P Λ
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and that
ν “ rO
¨˝
B
mina,ytqˆayu
d
|A|aln p1{δq pdH lnpmq ` ln p1{βqq
m
‚˛
where we hide further logarithmic dependence on m, , and |A| under the rO notation.
We are now ready to conclude the DP-oracle-learner algorithm’s analysis with the main
theorem of this subsection that provides high probability bounds on the accuracy and fairness
violation of the output rQ of Algorithm 3. These bounds can be viewed as revealing the inherent
tradeoff between privacy of the algorithm and accuracy or fairness of the output classifier where
a stronger privacy guarantee (i.e. smaller  and δ) will lead to weaker accuracy and fairness
guarantees.
Theorem 4.4 (Error-Privacy, Fairness-Privacy Tradeoffs). Let p rQ, rλq be the output of Algo-
rithm 3 and let Q‹ be the solution to the non-private γ-fair ERM problem 2. We have that with
probability at least 1´ β,
xerr p rQq ď xerr pQ‹q ` 2ν
and for all a ‰ 0,
∆xFPa p rQq ď γ ` 1` 2ν
B
∆xTPa p rQq ď γ ` 1` 2ν
B
where
ν “ rO
¨˝
B
mina,ytqˆayu
d
|A|alnp1{δq pdH lnpmq ` lnp1{βqq
m
‚˛
Remark 4.1. Notice the bounds stated above reveal a tradeoff between accuracy and fairness
violation that we may control through the parameter B. As B gets increased, the upper bound on
error will get looser while the one on fairness violation gets tighter. We will consider a setting in
the next subsection where we can remove this extra tradeoff and choose B as small as possible —
at the cost of requiring that the classifiers be able to use protected attributes at test time.
We assumed so far in this section that the protected attribute A is not available to the classifiers
in H (“A-blind” classification) and stated all our bounds in terms of dH. In the more general
setting where classifiers in H could depend on A (“A-aware” classification), similar results hold.
The only change to make is to replace ln pmdHq with ln p|H|q in Algorithm 3 (when computing
the number of iterations T ) and in the bounds. See Theorem 4.5 for this generalization.
Theorem 4.5 (Error-Privacy, Fairness-Privacy Tradeoffs). Suppose |H| ă 8 and let p rQ, rλq be
the output of Algorithm 3 that runs for
T “ B
a
lnp4|A| ´ 3qm
2 p2|A|B ` 1qaln p1{δq pln p|H|q ` ln p2{βqq
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iterations, and let Q‹ be the solution to the non-private γ-fair ERM problem 2. We have that
with probability at least 1´ β,
xerr p rQq ď xerr pQ‹q ` 2ν
and for all a ‰ 0,
∆xFPa p rQq ď γ ` 1` 2ν
B
∆xTPa p rQq ď γ ` 1` 2ν
B
where
ν “ rO
¨˝
B
mina,ytqˆayu
d
|A|aln p1{δq pln p|H|{βqq
m
‚˛
4.1 An Extension: Better Tradeoffs for A-aware Classification
In this subsection we show that if we only ask for equalized false positive rates (instead of
equalized odds, which also requires equalized true positive rates), and moreover, if we assume H
includes all “maximally discriminatory” classifiers (see Assumption 4.1), the fairness violation
guarantees given in Theorem 4.5 can be improved. As a consequence, the tradeoff discussed in
Remark 4.1 will be no longer an issue. Thus, in this subsection, we are interested in solving the
γ-fair ERM Problem 4 which now only has false positive parity constraints.
γ-fair ERM Problem
min
Q P∆pHq
xerr pQq
s.t. @a P A
a‰0 : ∆
xFPapQq ď γ (4)
Assumption 4.1. H includes all maximally discriminatory classifiers (i.e. group indicator
functions): thapX,Aq “ 1A“a, h¯apX,Aq “ 1A‰a | a P Au Ď H.
Theorem 4.6 (Error-Privacy, Fairness-Privacy Tradeoffs). Suppose |H| ă 8, B ą |A| ´ 1, and
let Assumption 4.1 hold. Let p rQ, rλq be the output of Algorithm 3, and let Q‹ be the solution to
the γ-fair ERM problem 4. We have that with probability at least 1´ β,
xerr p rQq ď xerr pQ‹q ` 2ν
and for all a ‰ 0,
∆xFPa p rQq ď γ ` 2ν
B ´ p|A| ´ 1q
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.6, we have the following Corollary where B “ |A|
can be chosen to get bounds which are now free of B.
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Corollary 4.6.1. Under assumptions stated in Theorem 4.6, one can choose B “ |A| in
Algorithm 3, in which case with probability at least 1´ β,
xerr p rQq ď xerr pQ‹q ` 2ν
and for all a ‰ 0,
∆xFPa p rQq ď γ ` 2ν
where
ν “ rO
¨˝
|A|
mina,ytqˆayu
d
|A|alnp1{δq lnp|H|{βq
m
‚˛
4.2 A Separation: A-blind vs. A-aware Classification
In this subsection we show that the sensitivity of the accuracy of the optimal classifier subject to
fairness constraints can be substantially higher if it is prohibited from using sensitive attributes
at test time. This implies that higher error must be introduced when estimating this accuracy
subject to differential privacy. This shows a fundamental tension between the goals of trading
off privacy and approximate equalized odds, with the goal of preventing disparate treatment.
Given a data set D of m individuals, define fpDq to be the optimal error rate in the γ-fair ERM
problem 4 which is constrained to have a false positive rate disparity of at most γ.
Consider the following problem instance. Let X be the unprotected attribute taking value in
X “ tU, V u, and let A be the protected attribute taking value in A “ tR,Bu. Suppose H
consists of two classifiers h0 and hU where h0pX,Aq “ 0 and hU pX,Aq “ 1X“U . Notice that
both h0 and hU depend only on the unprotected attribute. Consider two other classifiers hR and
hB that depend on the protected attribute: hRpX,Aq “ 1A“R and hBpX,Aq “ 1A“B.
Theorem 4.7. Consider γ ą 1{m and data sets with mina qˆa0 ě C for some constant C ą 0. If
H “ th0, hUu, the sensitivity of f is Ωp1{pγmqq. If the “maximally discriminatory” classifier hR
and hB are included in H as well, i.e. H “ th0, hU , hR, hBu, the sensitivity of f is Op1{mq.
5 Experimental Evaluation
As a proof of concept, we empirically evaluate our two algorithms on a common fairness benchmark
dataset: the Communities and Crime dataset2 from the UC Irvine Machine Learning Repository.
We refer the reader to [Kearns et al., 2018a] for an outline of potential fairness concerns present
in the dataset. We clean and preprocess the data identically to [Kearns et al., 2018a]. Our main
experimental goal is to obtain, for both algorithms, the Pareto frontier of error and fairness
violation tradeoffs for different levels of differential privacy. To elaborate, for a given setting of
input parameters, we start with the target fairness violation bound γ “ 0 and then increase it
2Briefly, each record in this dataset summarizes aggregate socioeconomic information about both the citizens
and police force in a particular U.S. community, and the problem is to predict whether the community has a high
rate of violent crime.
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 Figure 1: Left figure shows the Pareto frontier of error and (equalized odds) fairness violation for the DP-oracle-
learner algorithm on the Communities dataset across different privacy parameters . Right figure shows the
corresponding Pareto curves for the DP-postprocessing algorithm. Each point on the private curves is averaged
over many rounds to reduce the effect of noise variance. See text for details.
over a rich pre-specified subset of r0, 1s while recording for each γ the error and the (realized)
fairness violation of the classifier output by the algorithm. We take H to be the class of linear
threshold functions, β “ 0.05, and δ “ 10´7.
Logistic regression is used as the base classifier of the DP-postprocessing algorithm in our
experiments. To implement the Learner’s cost-sensitive classification oracle used in the DP-
oracle-learner algorithm, following [Kearns et al., 2018a], we build a regression-based linear
predictor for each vector of costs (C0 and C1), and classify a point according to the lowest
predicted cost. We made this private following the method of [Smith et al., 2017]: computing
each regression as pXTXq´1XTCb, and adding appropriately scaled Laplace noise to both XTX
and XTCb. Note when the sensitive attribute A is not included in X (the A-blind case, as in our
experiments) noise need not be added to XTX as we only need to guarantee the privacy of A.
The theory is ambiguous in its predictions about which algorithm should perform better: the
“privacy cost” is higher for the in-processing algorithm, but the benchmark that the post-processing
algorithm competes with is weaker. We would generally expect therefore that on sufficiently
large datasets, the in-processing algorithm would obtain better tradeoffs, but on small datasets,
the post-processing algorithm would.
Our experimental results appear in Fig. 1. Indeed, on our relatively small dataset (m « 2K), the
post-processing algorithm can obtain good tradeoffs between accuracy and fairness at meaningful
levels of , whereas the in-processing algorithm cannot. Nevertheless, we can empirically obtain
the “shape” of the Pareto curve trading off accuracy and fairness for unreasonable levels of 
using our algorithm. This is still valuable, because the value of  obtained by our algorithms
predictably decreases as the dataset size m increases without otherwise changing the dynamics
of the algorithm. For example, if we “upsampled” our dataset by a factor of 10 (i.e. taking 10
copies of the dataset), the result would be a reasonably sized dataset of m « 20K. Our algorithm
run on this upsampled dataset would obtain the same tradeoff curve but now with meaningful
values of . In the left panel of Fig. 1,  is the actual privacy parameter used in the experiments;
while 1 is the value that the privacy parameter would take on the dataset that was upsampled
by a factor of 10.
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Recall that the post-processing approach requires the use of the protected attribute at test time,
but the in-processing approach does not. Our results therefore suggest that the requirement that
we not use the protected attribute at test time (i.e. that we be avoid “disparate treatment”)
might be extremely burdensome if we also want the protections of differential privacy and have
only small dataset sizes. In contrast, it can be overcome with the in-processing algorithm at
larger dataset sizes.
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A Appendix for Models and Preliminaries: Differential Privacy
An important property of differential privacy is that it is robust to post-processing. The post-
processing of an p, δq-DP algorithm output remains p, δq-DP.
Lemma A.1 (Post-Processing [Dwork et al., 2006b]). Let M : Dm Ñ O be a p, δq-DP algorithm
and let f : O Ñ R be any randomized function. We have that the algorithm f oM : Dm Ñ R is
p, δq-DP.
Another important property of differential privacy is that DP algorithms can be composed
adaptively with a graceful degradation in their privacy parameters.
Theorem A.2 (Composition [Dwork et al., 2010]). Let Mt be an pt, δtq-DP algorithm for t P rT s.
We have that the composition M “ pM1, . . . ,MT q is p, δq-DP where  “ řt t and δ “ řt δt.
Following the Composition Theorem A.2, if for instance, an iterative algorithm that runs in T
iterations is to be made private with target privacy parameters  and δ “ 0, each iteration must
be made {T -DP. This may lead to a huge amount of per iteration noise if T is too large. The
Advanced Composition Theorem A.3 instead allows the privacy parameter at each step to scale
with Op{?T q.
Theorem A.3 (Advanced Composition [Dwork et al., 2010]). Suppose 0 ă  ă 1 and δ ą 0 are
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Figure 2: The post-processing technique. In the training phase, training examples are used to train the base
classifier and find the optimal p‹ by solving LP (5).
target privacy parameters. Let Mt be a p1, δ1q-DP algorithm for all t P rT s. We have that the
composition M “ pM1, . . . ,MT q is p, T δ1 ` δq-DP where  “ 21
a
2T lnp1{δq.
B Appendix for DP Fair Learning: Post-processing
B.1 Fair Learning Approach of [Hardt et al., 2016]
We briefly review the fair learning approach of [Hardt et al., 2016] in this subsection. Suppose
there is an arbitrary base classifier pY which is trained on the set of training examples tpXi, Yiqumi“1.
The goal is to make the classifications of the base classifier γ-fair with respect to the sensitive
attribute A by post-processing the predictions given by pY . With slight abuse of notation, letpYp denote the derived optimal γ-fair randomized classifier where p “ ppyˆaqyˆ,a is a vector of
probabilities describing pYp and that pyˆa :“ P rpYp “ 1 | pY “ yˆ, A “ as. Among all fair pYp’s, the
one with minimum error can be found by solving the optimization problem LP (5). Once the
optimal solution p‹ is found, one would then use this vector of probabilities, along with the
estimate pY given by the base classifier and the sensitive attribute A, to make further predictions.
See Fig. 2 for a visual presentation of the adopted model.
LP: Linear Program
arg min
p
err
´pYp¯
s.t. @a P A
a‰0 ∆FPa
´pYp¯ ď γ
∆TPa
´pYp¯ ď γ
0 ď pyˆa ď 1 @yˆ, a
(5)
Since the true underlying distribution P is not known, in practice the empirical distributionpP is used to estimate the quantities appearing in LP (5). Using simple probability techniques,
one can expand the empirical quantities xerr ppYpq, ∆xFPappYpq, and ∆ xTPappYpq in a linear form in p
with coefficients being a function of qˆyˆay and qˆay quantities (see xLP (6)).
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xLP: Empirical Linear Program
arg min
p
xerr ´pYp¯
s.t. @a P A
a‰0 ∆
xFPa ´pYp¯ ď γ
∆ xTPa ´pYp¯ ď γ
0 ď pyˆa ď 1 @yˆ, a
(6)
xerr ´pYp¯ “ řyˆ,a pqˆyˆa0 ´ qˆyˆa1q ¨ pyˆa `řyˆ,a qˆyˆa1
∆xFPa ´pYp¯ “ ˇˇˇ xFPa ´pY ¯ ¨ p1a ` ´1´ xFPa ´pY ¯¯ ¨ p0a ´ xFP0 ´pY ¯ ¨ p10 ´ ´1´ xFP0 ´pY ¯¯ ¨ p00 ˇˇˇ
∆ xTPa ´pYp¯ “ ˇˇˇ xTPa ´pY ¯ ¨ p1a ` ´1´ xTP1 ´pY ¯¯ ¨ p0a ´ xTP0 ´pY ¯ ¨ p10 ´ ´1´ xTP0 ´pY ¯¯ ¨ p00 ˇˇˇ
B.2 Proof of Theorem 3.1
The proof of Theorem 3.1 relies on some facts which are stated here.
Claim B.1 (`1-Sensitivity of qˆ to A). Let qˆ “ rqˆyˆaysyˆ,a,y be the empirical distribution of tpY ,A, Y u
and let ∆qˆ be the `1-sensitivity of qˆ to A. We have that
∆qˆ “ max
A,A1 PAm
A„A1
›› qˆ pAq ´ qˆ `A1˘››
1
“ 2
m
Lemma B.2. Suppose min
a,y
tqˆayu ą 4 ln p4|A|{βq { pmq. we have that with probability ě 1´ β,
1.
ˇˇˇĂerr ´pYp¯´ xerr ´pYp¯ˇˇˇ ď 12|A| lnp4|A|{βqm ;@ p.
2. q˜ay ą 0 ;@ a, y.
3.
ˇˇˇ ĂFPa ´pY ¯´ xFPa ´pY ¯ˇˇˇ ď 2 lnp4|A|{βqq˜a0m , ˇˇˇ ĂTPa ´pY ¯´ xTPa ´pY ¯ˇˇˇ ď 2 lnp4|A|{βqq˜a1m ;@ a.
4.
ˇˇˇ
∆ĂFPa ´pYp¯´∆xFPa ´pYp¯ˇˇˇ ď 4 lnp4|A|{βqmintq˜a0,q˜00um , ˇˇˇ∆ĂTPa ´pYp¯´∆xTPa ´pYp¯ˇˇˇ ď 4 lnp4|A|{βqmintq˜a1,q˜01um ;@ a, p.
5. pˆ‹, the optimal solution of xLP (6), is feasible in ĂLP (1).
Proof of Lemma B.2. By Claim B.1 and Theorem 2.1, we have that with probability at least
1´ β, ||qˆ ´ q˜||8 ď ln p4|A|{βq ¨ p2{mq. Hence with probability ě 1´ β,
1. @ p, ˇˇˇĂerr ppYpq ´ xerr ppYpqˇˇˇ ď ÿ
yˆ,a,y
|q˜yˆay ´ qˆyˆay| `
ÿ
yˆ,a
|q˜yˆa1 ´ qˆyˆa1| ď 12|A| lnp4|A|{βq
m
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2. For all a, y,
|q˜ay ´ qˆay| “ |q˜1ay ` q˜0ay ´ qˆ1ay ´ qˆ0ay|
ď |q˜1ay ´ qˆ1ay| ` |q˜0ay ´ qˆ0ay|
ď 4 lnp4|A|{βq
m
But by the stated assumption, qˆay ą 4 lnp4|A|{βqm implying that q˜ay ą 0.
3. @ a, ˇˇˇ ĂFPappY q ´ xFPappY qˇˇˇ “ ˇˇˇˇ q˜1a0
q˜1a0 ` q˜0a0 ´
qˆ1a0
qˆ1a0 ` qˆ0a0
ˇˇˇˇ
“
ˇˇˇˇ
q˜1a0 qˆ0a0 ´ qˆ1a0 q˜0a0
pq˜1a0 ` q˜0a0qpqˆ1a0 ` qˆ0a0q
ˇˇˇˇ
“
ˇˇˇˇ
qˆ0a0pq˜1a0 ´ qˆ1a0q ´ qˆ1a0pq˜0a0 ´ qˆ0a0q
pq˜1a0 ` q˜0a0qpqˆ1a0 ` qˆ0a0q
ˇˇˇˇ
ď 2 lnp4|A|{βq|q˜a0|m
“ 2 lnp4|A|{βq
q˜a0m
pby Part 2 of this Lemmaq
And similarly, ˇˇˇ ĂTPappY q ´ xTPappY qˇˇˇ ď 2 lnp4|A|{βq
q˜a1m
4. Observe that @ a, p,ˇˇˇ
∆ĂFPappYpq ´∆xFPappYpqˇˇˇ
ď
ˇˇˇ ĂFPappY q ¨ p1a ` p1´ ĂFPappY qq ¨ p0a ´ ĂFP0ppY q ¨ p10 ´ p1´ ĂFP0ppY qq ¨ p00
´ xFPappY q ¨ p1a ´ p1´ xFPappY qq ¨ p0a ` xFP0ppY q ¨ p10 ` p1´ xFP0ppY qq ¨ p00 ˇˇˇ
ď
ˇˇˇ ĂFPappY q ´ xFPappY qˇˇˇ ¨ |p1a ´ p0a| ` ˇˇˇ ĂFP0ppY q ´ xFP0ppY qˇˇˇ ¨ |p10 ´ p0|
ď 4 lnp4|A|{βq
mintq˜a0, q˜00um (by part 3 of this Lemma)
A similar argument holds for
ˇˇˇ
∆ ĂTPappYpq ´∆ xTPappYpqˇˇˇ ď 4 lnp4|A|{βqmintq˜a1,q˜01um .
5. We will show that p‹ satisfies the first constraint of ĂLP (1) for all a P A. Satisfying the
second constraint can be similarly shown and the third is trivial. We have thatˇˇˇ
∆ĂFPappYp‹qˇˇˇ “ ˇˇˇ∆ĂFPappYp‹q ´∆xFPappYp‹q `∆xFPappYp‹qˇˇˇ
ď
ˇˇˇ
∆xFPappYp‹qˇˇˇ` ˇˇˇ∆ĂFPappYp‹q ´∆xFPappYp‹qˇˇˇ
ď γ ` 4 lnp4|A|{βq
mintq˜a0, q˜00um
by part 4 of this Lemma and the fact that
ˇˇˇ
∆xFPappYp‹qˇˇˇ ď γ (see xLP (6)).
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Proof of Theorem 3.1. Following Lemma B.2, with probability at least 1´ β
xerr ppYrp‹q ď Ăerr ppYrp‹q ` 12|A| lnp4|A|{βq
m
(part 1 of Lemma B.2)
ď Ăerr ppYp‹q ` 12|A| lnp4|A|{βq
m
(part 5 of Lemma B.2)
ď xerr ppYp‹q ` 24|A| lnp4|A|{βq
m
(part 1 of Lemma B.2)
Also, for all a ‰ 0,
∆xFPa ppYrp‹q ď ∆ĂFPappYrp‹q ` 4 lnp4|A|{βq
mintq˜a0, q˜00um (part 4 of Lemma B.2)
ď γ ` 8 lnp4|A|{βq
mintq˜a0, q˜00um (see
ĂLP (1))
ď γ ` 8 lnp4|A|{βq
mintqˆa0, qˆ00um´ 4 lnp4|A|{βq
The last inequality follows from the fact that |q˜ay ´ qˆay| ď 4 lnp4|A|{βq{m for all a, y. It follows
similarly that,
∆ xTPa ppYrp‹q ď γ ` 8 lnp4|A|{βq
mintqˆa1, qˆ01um´ 4 lnp4|A|{βq
C Appendix for DP Fair Learning: In-processing
C.1 Fair Learning Approach of [Agarwal et al., 2018]
Suppose given a class of binary classifiers H, the task is to find the optimal γ-fair classifier in
∆pHq, where ∆pHq is the set of all randomized classifiers that can be obtained by functions in
H. [Agarwal et al., 2018] provided a reduction of the learning problem with only the fairness
constraint to a two-player zero-sum game and introduced an algorithm that achieves the lowest
empirical error. In this section we mainly discuss their reduction approach which forms the basis
of our differentially private fair learning algorithm: DP-oracle-learner. Although [Agarwal
et al., 2018] considers a general form of a constraint that captures many existing notions of fairness,
in this paper, we focus on the Equalized Odds notion of fairness described in Definition 2.1. Our
techniques, however, generalize beyond this. To begin with, the γ-fair classification task can be
modeled as the constrained optimization problem 7.
γ-fair Learning Problem
min
Q P∆pHq
err pQq
s.t. @a P A
a‰0 : ∆FPapQq ď γ
∆TPapQq ď γ
(7)
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As the data generating distribution P is unknown, we will be dealing with the Fair Empirical Risk
Minimization (ERM) problem 8. In this empirical version, all the probabilities and expectations
are taken with respect to the empirical distribution of the data pP.
γ-fair ERM Problem
min
Q P∆pHq
xerr pQq
s.t. @a P A
a‰0 : ∆
xFPapQq ď γ
∆ xTPapQq ď γ
(8)
Toward deriving a fair classification algorithm, the above fair ERM problem 8 will be rewritten as
a two-player zero-sum game whose equilibrium is the solution to the problem. Let prpQq P R4p|A|´1q
store all fairness violations of the classifier Q.
prpQq :“
»———–
xFPapQq ´ xFP0pQq ´ γxFP0pQq ´ xFPapQq ´ γxTPapQq ´ xTP0pQq ´ γxTP0pQq ´ xTPapQq ´ γ
fiffiffiffifl
aPA
a‰0
P R4p|A|´1q
For dual variable λ “ “λpa,0,`q, λpa,0,´q, λpa,1,`q, λpa,1,´q‰JaPA
a‰0
P R4p|A|´1q, let
LpQ,λq “ xerr pQq ` λJprpQq
be the Lagrangian of the optimization problem. We therefore have that the Fair ERM Problem
8 is equivalent to
min
Q P∆pHq
max
λ PR4|A|`
LpQ,λq
In order to guarantee convergence, we further constrain the `1 norm of λ to be bounded. So let
Λ “ tλ P R4p|A|´1q` : ||λ||1 ď Bu be the feasible space of the dual variable λ for some constant
B. Hence, the primal and the dual problems are as follows.
primal problem: min
Q P∆pHq
max
λ PΛ LpQ,λq
dual problem: max
λ PΛ minQ P∆pHq
LpQ,λq
The above primal and dual problems can be shown to have solutions that coincide at a point
pQ‹,λ‹q which is the saddle point of L. From a game theoretic perspective, the saddle point can
be viewed as an equilibrium of a zero-sum game between a Learner (Q-player) and an Auditor
(λ-player) where LpQ,λq is how much the Learner must pay to the Auditor. Algorithm 5,
developed by [Agarwal et al., 2018], proceeds iteratively according to a no-regret dynamic where
in each iteration, the Learner plays the best response (BESTh) to the given play of the Auditor
and the Auditor plays exponentiated gradient descent. The average play of both players over T
rounds are then taken as the output of the algorithm, which can be shown to converge to the
saddle point pQ‹,λ‹q ([Freund and Schapire, 1996]). [Agarwal et al., 2018] shows how BESTh
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can be solved efficiently having access to the cost-sensitive classification oracle for H (CSCpHq)
and we have their reduction for our Equalized Odds notion of fairness written in Subroutine 4.
Assumption C.1 (Cost-Sensitive Classification Oracle for H). It is assumed that the proposed
algorithm has access to CSC pHq which is the cost-sensitive classification oracle for H. This
oracle takes as input a set of individual-level attributes and costs tXi, C0i , C1i umi“1, and outputs
arg minh PH
řm
i“1 hpXiqC1i ` p1´ hpXiqqC0i . In practice, these oracles are implemented using
learning heuristics.
Note that the Learner finds arg minQP∆pHq LpQ,λq for a given λ of the Auditor and since the
Lagrangian L is linear in Q, the minimizer of LpQ,λq can be chosen to put all the probability
mass on a single classifier h P H. Additionally, our reduction in Subroutine 4 looks different from
the one derived in Example 4 of [Agarwal et al., 2018] since we have our Equalized Odds fairness
constraints formulated a bit differently from how it is formulated in [Agarwal et al., 2018].
Subroutine 4: BESTh
Input: λ, training examples tpXi, Ai, Yiqumi“1
for i “ 1, . . . ,m do
C0i Ð 1tYi ‰ 0u
C1i Ð 1tYi ‰ 1u ` λpAi,Yi,`q´λpAi,Yi,´qqˆAiYi 1tAi ‰ 0u ´
ř
aPA
a‰0
λpa,Yi,`q´λpa,Yi,´q
qˆAiYi
1tAi “ 0u
end
Call CSC pHq to find h‹ “ arg min
hPH
řm
i“1 hpXiqC1i ` p1´ hpXiqqC0i
Output: h‹
Algorithm 5: exp. gradient reduction for fair classification ([Agarwal et al., 2018])
Input: fairness violation γ
bound B, learning rate η, number of rounds T
training examples tpXi, Ai, Yiqumi“1
θ1 Ð 0 P R4p|A|´1q
for t “ 1, . . . , T do
λt,k Ð B exppθt,kq1`řk1 exppθt,k1 q for 1 ď k ď 4p|A| ´ 1q
ht Ð BESThpλtq
θt`1 Ð θt ` η prtphtq
endpQÐ 1T řTt“1 ht, pλÐ 1T řTt“1 λt
Output: p pQ, pλq
[Agarwal et al., 2018] shows for any ν ą 0, and for appropriately chosen η and T , Algorithm 5
under Assumption C.1 returns a pair p pQ, pλq for which
Lp pQ, pλq ď LpQ, pλq ` ν for all Q P ∆pHq
Lp pQ, pλq ě Lp pQ,λq ´ ν for all λ P Λ
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that corresponds to a ν-approximate equilibrium of the game and it implies neither player can
gain more than ν by changing their strategy (see Theorem 1 of [Agarwal et al., 2018]). They
further show that any ν-approximate equilibrium of the game achieves an error close to the
best error one would hope to get and the amount by which it violates the fairness constraints is
reasonably small (see Theorem 2 of [Agarwal et al., 2018]).
C.2 Missing Lemmas and Proofs of Section 4
Lemma C.1 (Sensitivity of the Private Players to A). Let ∆prt and ∆`t be the sensitivity of prt
(of the Auditor) and `t (of the Learner) respectively. We have that for all t P rT s,
∆prt “ max
A,A1PAm
A„A1
||prtpAq ´ prtpA1q||1 ď 2|A|
mina,ytqˆayum´ 1
∆`t “ max
hPH maxA,A1PAm
A„A1
|`tph;Aq ´ `tph;A1q| ď 2|A|B ` 1
mina,ytqˆayum´ 1
Proof of Lemma C.1. Recall that at round t, the private λ-player is given some ht P H and
wants to calculate
prtphtq “
»———–
xFPaphtq ´ xFP0phtq ´ γxFP0phtq ´ xFPaphtq ´ γxTPaphtq ´ xTP0phtq ´ γxTP0phtq ´ xTPaphtq ´ γ
fiffiffiffifl
aPA
a‰0
P R4p|A|´1q
privately, where for all a P A, we have that
xFPaphtq “ qˆ1a0
qˆa0
“ qˆ1a0
qˆ1a0 ` qˆ0a0
xTPaphtq “ qˆ1a1
qˆa1
“ qˆ1a1
qˆ1a1 ` qˆ0a1
Having modified one of the records in A P Am, say Aj “ a is changed to A1j “ a1 for some
j P rms, qˆyˆjayj will then decrease by 1{m and qˆyˆ1a1yj will increase by 1{m where yˆ1 may or may
not be equal to yˆj . Thus, depending on the value of yj , it is then the case that
• if yj “ 0: xFPaphtq and xFPa1phtq will change by at most 1{ pmina,ytqˆayum´ 1q.
• if yj “ 1: xTPaphtq and xTPa1phtq will change by at most 1{ pmina,ytqˆayum´ 1q.
Therefore, since each xFPa (xTPa) appears twice in prtphtq if a ‰ 0 and 2p|A| ´ 1q times if a “ 0,
we have that
∆prt ď 2|A|
mina,ytqˆayum´ 1
Let’s move on to the sensitivity of `t of the private Q-player. Recall that at round t, the Q-player
is given some λt P Λ and wants to find arg minhPH `tphq ” Lph,λtq “ xerr phq `λJt prtphq privately.
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It is then obvious that since ||λt||1 ď B,
∆`t ď 1
m
` 2|A|B
mina,ytqˆayum´ 1
ď 2|A|B ` 1
mina,ytqˆayum´ 1
Lemma C.2 (Accuracy of the Private Players). At round t of Algorithm 3, let prt “ rt ´W t be
the noiseless version of rt and h‹t be the classifier given by the noiseless subroutine BESThprλtq.
We have that
w.p. ě 1´ β{2T, ||rt ´ prt||8 ď 8|A|aT lnp1{δq ln p8T |A|{βqpmina,ytqˆayum´ 1q ¨ 
w.p. ě 1´ β{2T, Lprht, rλtq ď Lph‹t , rλtq ` 8 p2|A|B ` 1qaT ln p1{δq pdH ln pmq ` ln p2T {βqqpmina,ytqˆayum´ 1q ¨ 
Proof of Lemma C.2. Results follow from Lemma C.1, Theorem 2.1 and Theorem 2.2 of this
paper. Recall that |HpSq| ď OpmdHq by Sauer’s Lemma.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. This result follows directly from the accuracy of the private Q-player given
in Lemma C.2.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. We follow the proof given for Theorem 1 of [Agarwal et al., 2018] and
modify where necessary. Let Λ1 “ tλ1 P R4|A|´3` : ||λ1||1 “ Bu. Any λ P Λ is associated with a
λ1 P Λ1 which is equal to λ on the first 4p|A| ´ 1q coordinates and has the remaining mass on the
last one. Let r1t P R4|A|´3 be equal to rt on the first 4p|A| ´ 1q coordinates and zero in the last
one. We have that for any λ and its associated λ1, and particularly rλt and rλ1t of Algorithm 3,
and all t
λJ rt “ pλ1qJ r1t , rλJt rt “ prλ1tqJ r1t (9)
Observe that with probability at least 1´β{2T , ||r1t||8 “ ||rt||8 ď 2` 8|A|?T lnp1{δq lnp8T |A|{βqpmina,ytqˆayum´1q¨ (see
Lemma C.2). Thus, by Corollary 2.14 of [Shalev-Shwartz, 2012], we have that with probability
at least 1´ β{2, for any λ1 P Λ1,
Tÿ
t“1
pλ1qJ r1t ď Tÿ
t“1
prλ1tqJ r1t ` B lnp4|A| ´ 3qη ` 4ηB
˜
1` 4|A|
a
T lnp1{δq lnp8T |A|{βq
pmina,ytqˆayum´ 1q ¨ 
¸2
T
Consequently, by Equation 9, we have that with probability at least 1´ β{2, for any λ P Λ,
Tÿ
t“1
λJ rt ď Tÿ
t“1
rλJt rt ` B lnp4|A| ´ 3qη ` 4ηB
˜
1` 4|A|
a
T lnp1{δq lnp8T |A|{βq
pmina,ytqˆayum´ 1q ¨ 
¸2
T (10)
which completes the proof.
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Proof of Theorem 4.3. Let
RQ :“ 8p2|A|B ` 1q
a
T lnp1{δq pdH lnpmq ` lnp2T {βqq
pmina,ytqˆayum´ 1q ¨ 
and
Rλ :“ B lnp4|A| ´ 3q
ηT
` 4ηB
˜
1` 4|A|
a
T lnp1{δq lnp8T |A|{βq
pmina,ytqˆayum´ 1q ¨ 
¸2
be the regret bounds of the private Q and λ players respectively, and let ν :“ RQ ` Rλ. We
have that for any Q P ∆pHpSqq, with probability at least 1´ β,
LpQ, rλq “ 1
T
Tÿ
t“1
LpQ, rλtq (by linearity of Lq
ě 1
T
Tÿ
t“1
Lprht, rλtq ´RQ pby Lemma 4.1q
ě 1
T
Tÿ
t“1
Lprht, rλq ´Rλ ´RQ pby Lemma 4.2q
“ Lp rQ, rλq ´ ν
Now for any λ P Λ, with probability at least 1´ β,
Lp rQ,λq “ 1
T
Tÿ
t“1
Lprht,λq (by linearity of Lq
ď 1
T
Tÿ
t“1
Lprht, rλtq `Rλ pby Lemma 4.2q
ď 1
T
Tÿ
t“1
Lp rQ, rλtq `Rλ `RQ pby Lemma 4.1q
“ Lp rQ, rλq ` ν
Therefore, with probability at least 1´ β,
Lp rQ, rλq ď LpQ, rλq ` ν for all Q P ∆pHpSqq
Lp rQ, rλq ě Lp rQ,λq ´ ν for all λ P Λ
and that
ν “ B lnp4|A| ´ 3q
ηT
` 4ηB
˜
1` 4|A|
a
T lnp1{δq lnp8T |A|{βq
pmina,ytqˆayum´ 1q ¨ 
¸2
` 8p2|A|B ` 1q
a
T lnp1{δq pdH lnpmq ` lnp2T {βqq
pmina,ytqˆayum´ 1q ¨ 
Plugging in the proposed values of T and η in Algorithm 3 results in
ν “ rO
¨˝
B
mina,ytqˆayu
d
|A|alnp1{δq pdH lnpmq ` lnp1{βqq
m
‚˛
where we hide further logarithmic dependence on m, , and |A| under the rO notation.
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The following two lemmas are taken from [Agarwal et al., 2018] and are used in the proof of
Theorem 4.4 and Theorem 4.6.
Lemma C.3 (Empirical Error Bound [Agarwal et al., 2018]). Let p rQ, rλq be any ν-approximate
solution of the game described in section 4,i.e.,
Lp rQ, rλq ď LpQ, rλq ` ν for all Q P ∆pHq
Lp rQ, rλq ě Lp rQ,λq ´ ν for all λ P Λ
For any Q satisfying the fairness constraints of the fair ERM problem, we have that
xerr p rQq ď xerr pQq ` 2ν
Lemma C.4 (Empirical Fairness Violation [Agarwal et al., 2018]). Let p rQ, rλq be any ν-
approximate solution of the game described in section 4, i.e.,
Lp rQ, rλq ď LpQ, rλq ` ν for all Q P ∆pHq
Lp rQ, rλq ě Lp rQ,λq ´ ν for all λ P Λ
and suppose the fairness constraints of the fair ERM problem are feasible. Then the distributionrQ satisfies
max
a PA
ˇˇˇ xFPap rQq ´ xFP0 ´ rQ¯ˇˇˇ ď γ ` 1` 2ν
B
max
a PA
ˇˇˇ xTPap rQq ´ xTP0 ´ rQ¯ˇˇˇ ď γ ` 1` 2ν
B
Proof of Theorem 4.4. The results follow from Theorem 4.3, Lemma C.3, and Lemma C.4.
Proof of Theorem 4.6. The stated bound on xerr p rQq follows from Lemma C.3. Let’s now prove
the bound on fairness violation. Let, for all a P A, βa :“ pxFP0p rQq ´ xFPap rQq ´ γq` and
β¯a :“ pxFPap rQq ´ xFP0p rQq ´ γq`. Notice at most one of βa and β¯a can be positive.
We are going to construct some deviating strategies: Q and λ. As shown in the previous
subsection, we know p rQ, rλq is a ν-approximate equilibrium of the zero-sum game. It implies
Lp rQ,λq ´ ν ď Lp rQ, rλq ď LpQ, rλq ` ν.
Define Q “ 1
1`řaPApβa`β¯aqp rQ`řa βaha ` βˆahˆaq. It is easy to see that, for all a P A,
∆xFPapQq ĺ γ.
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Then we have
LpQ, rλq ` ν
ďxerr pQq ` ν
ďxerr ˜ 1
1`řaPApβa ` β¯aqp rQ`
ÿ
a
βaha ` βˆahˆaq
¸
` ν
ď 1
1`řaPApβa ` β¯aqxerr p rQq `
ř
aPApβa ` β¯aq
1`řaPApβa ` β¯aq ` ν
ďxerr p rQq ` ÿ
aPA
pβa ` β¯aq ` ν
ďxerr p rQq ` p|A| ´ 1q ¨ pmax
aPA |xFPap rQq ´ xFP0p rQq| ´ γq` ` ν.
Define λ to have B in the coordinate which corresponds to arg maxaPA |xFPap rQq ´ xFP0p rQq| and
0 in other coordinates. Then we have
Lp rQ,λq ´ ν “ xerr p rQq `Bpmax
aPA |xFPap rQq ´ xFP0p rQq| ´ γq ´ ν
To sum up, we get
xerr p rQq`Bpmax
aPA |xFPap rQq´xFP0p rQq|´γq´ν ď xerr p rQq`p|A|´1q¨pmaxaPA |xFPap rQq´xFP0p rQq|´γq``ν.
This implies
max
a PA |xFPap rQq ´ xFP0p rQq| ď γ ` 2νB ´ p|A| ´ 1q .
which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 4.7. First consider the case where H “ th0, hUu. Choose data set D of size
m as follows: m{2 individuals with pA “ R,X “ V, Y “ 0q; m{4 individuals with pA “ B,X “
U, Y “ 1q, mp1 ´ γq{4 individuals with pA “ B,X “ V, Y “ 0q and mγ{4 individuals with
pA “ B,X “ U, Y “ 0q. For this data set, it is easy to check that hU has error γ{4 and hU satisfies
the fairness constraint. So fpDq ď γ{4. Now consider D’s neighboring data set D1 by changing
one individual with pA “ B,X “ V, Y “ 0q to pA “ B,X “ U, Y “ 0q. For D1, the classifier
which satisfies the fairness constraint and has the minimum error rate is 14`γmp4h0 ` γmhU q.
Therefore
fpD1q “ 1
4` γm
ˆ
4 ¨ 1
4
` γm ¨ mγ{4` 1
m
˙
“ γ
4
` 1
4` γm.
implying that |fpDq ´ fpD1q| “ Ωp1{pγmqq and the sensitivity of f is Ωp1{pγmqq.
Now consider the case where H “ th0, hU , hR, hBu. It suffices to show that fpD1q ď fpDq `
Op1{mq for any neighboring data sets D and D1. Let Q˚ be the classifier with minimum error
rate on data set D. We have fpDq “ xerr pQ˚, Dq and we know |xFPRpQ˚, Dq ´ xFPBpQ˚, Dq| ď γ
(we put D into the arguments of xerr and xFP as we are talking about two different data sets).
For data set D1, there are two cases.
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• The case when |xFPRpQ˚, D1q ´ xFPBpQ˚, D1q| ď γ: In this case, we have
fpD1q ď xerr pQ˚, D1q ď xerr pQ˚, Dq ` 1{m “ fpDq ` 1{m.
• The case when |xFPRpQ˚, D1q ´ xFPBpQ˚, D1q| ą γ: Wlog let’s assume xFPRpQ˚, D1q ´xFPBpQ˚, D1q ą γ. And let α “ xFPRpQ˚, D1q ´ xFPBpQ˚, D1q ´ γ. We know α ą 0 and we
also have
α “ xFPRpQ˚, D1q´xFPBpQ˚, D1q´γ ď xFPRpQ˚, Dq´xFPBpQ˚, Dq´γ`2{pCmq ď 2{pCmq.
Now define Q1 “ 11`γ`α pp1` γqQ˚ ` αhBq. We have
xFPRpQ1, D1q´xFPBpQ1, D1q “ 1
1` γ ` α
´
p1` γqpxFPRpQ˚, D1q ´ xFPBpQ˚, D1qq ´ α¯ “ γ.
Therefore
fpD1q ď xerr pQ1, D1q
ď 1
1` γ ` α
`p1` γqxerr pQ˚, D1q ` αxerr phB, D1q˘
ď fpDq ` 1{m` α
ď fpDq `Op1{mq
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